Interim Fact-Finding Commission Continues Review of Developments in Georgia’s Occupied Territories (2004–2008) and the August 2008 War

The Interim Fact-Finding Commission on the Activities of the 2003-2012 Regime and its Political Officials held a session today focused on the situation in Georgia’s occupied territories between 2004 and 2008, and on the events related to the August 2008 war.
The Commission heard testimonies from three individuals.
The Commission was addressed by military doctor Lasha Koiava, who worked in military medical support from 2007 to 2008. According to his statement, major structural reforms in the armed forces began with the appointment of Giorgi Baramidze as Minister of Defence and Elene Khoshtaria as his assistant. As Koiava noted, they aimed to discharge all military veterans, though this plan was not carried out due to Baramidze’s dismissal. The initiative was later implemented by his successor, Irakli Okruashvili, who discharged 2,000 officers with a single order.
Koiava stated that Minister Okruashvili also abolished key military units and institutions, including the Land Forces Headquarters, Military Intelligence, ten U.S.-trained commando battalions, a mountain infantry battalion trained by the French and Swiss, the military hospital (later moved to Gori), the technical reconnaissance battalion, and the military academy, which was subsequently re-established in Gori but with an eight-month course that, according to him, was inadequate for proper officer training.
He further noted that as early as February 2008, he had received information from the Land Forces Commander suggesting that military operations were anticipated in May.
On 7 August 2008, a military briefing was scheduled for 05:00 but started late, during which a pre-planned military operation was discussed. According to the plan, the army was not to enter Tskhinvali but to block the Roki Tunnel to prevent Russian forces from entering Georgia. Georgian troops were then to be stationed around Tskhinvali, with negotiations to follow regarding the peaceful entry of the army and police into the city to avoid bloodshed.
Koiava stated that, in addition to Defence Minister Davit Kezerashvili and Joint Staff Head Zaza Gogava, the meeting was attended by non-military officials: Justice Minister Zurab Adeishvili, Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, and his deputy Shalva Janashvili. He attributed subsequent confusion to the interference of these civilian officials, who altered the original plan.
According to Koiava, while hostilities were officially set to begin at 07:00 on 8 August, artillery strikes on Tskhinvali commenced already at 23:42 on 7 August. He claimed that actual combat operations started 7–8 hours later than planned because they were ordered to wait for journalists to arrive, and logistical preparations were also underway for staging a public rally.
He added that Minister Kezerashvili issued a directive during the fighting—despite lacking the legal authority as a civilian—which resulted in troop movements that enabled Russian forces to cross the Georgian border and enter Tskhinvali. He also stated that President Mikheil Saakashvili’s withdrawal from Gori had a severely demoralising effect on Georgian forces.
Koiava further claimed that ruling party representatives were embedded with combat unit commanders prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
During the same session, the Commission heard from Shalva Janashvili, who served as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs during the war. He stated that he did not attend the 7 August morning briefing due to being on leave and only returned to Tbilisi that afternoon. In response to questions, he described who had given him orders between 7 and 9 August, outlined the actions of special forces and the Special Operations Battalion, and confirmed that he had received the order to enter Tskhinvali from Minister Merabishvili.
Regarding the same period, the Commission also questioned Zaza Gogava, Head of the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces during the August war. He stated that the Georgian military had not been trained to enter the territories of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Gogava described a gradual escalation beginning on 1 August, starting with the shelling of a Georgian village and, on 6 August, an attack on a Georgian peacekeeping post, which resulted in two deaths.
He said no retaliatory actions were taken at that time, as it was deemed that the Georgian side should exercise restraint and avoid a military response.
According to Gogava, at 23:45 on 7 August, the Commander-in-Chief ordered measures to suppress enemy fire directed at Georgian settlements and peacekeeping positions, which included weapons not permitted in the peacekeeping zone. A manoeuvre-based defensive operation was then planned on the basis of incoming intelligence.
He noted that these manoeuvres by Georgian units enabled the evacuation of civilians from mountain villages via the Tsveriakho route. In response to a question, Gogava confirmed that he had issued the order to enter Tskhinvali, which was passed on through the Interior Minister to his deputy.
Z. Gogava disagreed with Article 1633 of the Council of Europe’s resolution, which states that Georgian military actions had triggered the escalation into full-scale conflict.
Also today, the Commission decided to refer the case of Irakli Okruashvili to the Prosecutor’s Office for failing to appear as summoned at the previous session.
